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"AN OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL AND SECURITY QUESTIONS
CONCERNING TAIWANESE INDEPENDENCE"
Jason X. Hamiltont

Introduction
For over fifty years, the island of Taiwan has been home to the remnants and
descendants of China's nationalist government, the losing party in a civil war.'
Since the establishment of the "provisional" nationalist government in 1949,
Taiwan has developed into a formidable capitalist power with a burgeoning
democratic system of governance. However, although it has a functioning
democratic government, is a member of international economic organizations,
and has a permanent population of over twenty million people, the vast majority
of the international community, including the United States ("US"), has not
formally recognized Taiwan as a sovereign state.2 In the past few years, the
People's Republic of China ("PRC") has taken an increasingly belligerent stance
against Taiwan through its diplomatic actions and military exercises off
Taiwan's coast. 3 Because the threat to Taiwan's independence from the PRC is
increasing, the survival of this fledgling democracy and its ability to safely
declare its independence may depend on the US recognizing it as a formal
sovereign state. 4
A Concise History of Taiwanese and American Relations
Until its defeat in the Second World War, the Japanese Empire had ruled
Taiwan in accordance with the 1895 Treaty of Shimoneski. 5 Thereafter, control

f Mr. Hamilton is a Juris Doctor candidate at Loyola University Chicago School of Law, 2004.
United States Dept. of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, at http://www.state.gov
/r/pa/ei/bgn/2813.htm (last visited October 11, 2003)[hereinafter United States Dept. of State].
2 Taiwan, Online C.I.A. World FactBook, at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos

/tw.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2002) [hereinafter FactBook Taiwan].
3 See Kurt M. Campbell and Derek J. Mitchell, Crisis in the Taiwan Strait?, in FOREIGN

AFFAIRS, 14 (Council on Foreign Relations, 2001).
4 Such an action would have a monumental impact on Sino-American relations, however, the

author wishes to address only the more narrow issue of what legal and diplomatic reasons compel
recognizing Taiwanese statehood. Also, it is not the intent of this article to explore the dynamics of

Taiwan's growing independence movement and the threat of war with the PRC that so far has
prevented such a declaration.
5 Treaty of Peace, Apr. 28, 1952, ROC-Japan, art. II, 138 UNTS 3, noted in Jonathan I. Charney
& J.R.V. Prescott, Resolving Cross-StraitRelations Between China and Taiwan, 94. AM.J. INT'L L.
453, 458-59 (2000).
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of the island was returned to the Republic of China's Nationalist government
("ROC") under the Potsdam Proclamation of 1945.6 After Mao Tse-Tung's
Communist victory in 1949, the ROC government and nearly two million
nationalists fled China to Taiwan and established a government in accordance
with the Chinese Constitution of 1947,. This did not create a new state as much
as it established a nationalist government in exile to challenge Mao's
government in Beijing. 8 Thus, during the height of the Cold War there existed
"two Chinas," as the majority of the world recognized the ROC in Taiwan, while
the communist bloc supported the PRC on the mainland. 9 Even while in "exile,"
the ROC government in Taiwan continued to represent all of China at the United
Nations.' Viewing the ROC as a strategic ally against Communism in Asia, the
US entered into the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan in 1954.11 Under the
treaty, the US stationed significant military forces in Taiwan and provided aid to
the PRC attempted to seize several contested islands in the Straits
the ROC when
2
of Taiwan.'
However, in 1971, Taiwan's international status began to change. On October
25, 1971, the PRC replaced the ROC as representative of China at the United
Nations ("UN"), marking the international community's recognition of the PRC
as the sole, legitimate legal representative of China. 13 President Nixon instituted
this radical shift in American foreign policy as a "power move" designed to
introducing a new geopolitical counterweight to Soviet power.' 4 Former British
Prime Minister Harold Macmillan said that Nixon had "brought the oldest
civilization in the world back into the game to redress the new Russian

6

ROC-Japan, art. II, 138 UNTS 3, noted in Jonathan I. Chamey & J.R.V. Prescott, Resolving

Cross-StraitRelations Between China and Taiwan, 94. AM.J. INT'L L. 453, 458-59 (2000).
7 FactBook Taiwan, supra note
2.
8 See generally United States Dept. of State, supra note 1; see generally FactBook
Taiwan,
supra note 2.
9 Christopher J. Carolan, The "Republic of Taiwan ": A Legal-Historical Justification
for a
TaiwaneseDeclarationof Independence, 75 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 429, 436-37 (2000).
t0 Y. Frank Chiang, State, Sovereignty, and Taiwan, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 959, 975 (2000).
1 Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of China,
Dec. 2, 1954, U.S.- P.R.C. 6 U.S.T. 433. In accordance with the terms of the Treaty, the United
States and Taiwan pledged to offer material (i.e. military) and economic assistance against an
attack on either Party. Thus, an attack on Taiwan would likely result in an armed conflict between
the United States and the aggressor.
12 First Taiwan Strait Crisis: Quemoy and Matsu
Islands, at http://www.fas.org/man/dodl01
/ops/quemoy-matsu.htm (last visited October 11, 2003).
13 See United States Dept. of State Report on the
Diplomatic Relations of the Republic of China
and the People's Republic of China, available in 11 I.L.M. 571 (1972), noted in Angeline G. Chen,
Taiwan's InternationalPersonality:Crossing the River by Feeling the Stones, 20 LoY. L.A. INT'L
& COMP. L.J. 223, 234 (1998).
14 James C. Humes, NIXON'S TEN COMMANDMENTS OF STATECRAFT: His GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF
LEADERSHIP AND NEGOTIATION,

64 (1997).
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Empire."' 5 Although this action settled the issue of who represented China at the6
Taiwan.'
UN, it failed to address the question of whether the PRC represented
In 1972, President Nixon visited China and issued the "Shanghai Communique,"
17
which committed the US to removing its military presence from Taiwan. On
January 1, 1979, President Carter formally established diplomatic relations with
the PRC, recognizing it as the sole government of China and, in essence, "unrecognizing" the ROC. 18 The US subsequently terminated the Mutual Defense
Treaty with Taiwan and put a one-year freeze on arms sales to the ROC.' 9
Current Diplomatic Relations Between Taiwan and the United States
Despite the growing populist desire for statehood, Taiwan has yet to declare
its independence. 20 The United States has acknowledged, but not necessarily
adhered to, the PRC's claim that there is "one China and Taiwan is part of
China," as evidenced by continued political and economic relations with
Taiwan. 2 ' This is further evidenced by the Taiwan Relations Act of 1994, which
has increased military training and coordination with Taiwan.22 According to the
Act, the Secretary of Defense is required to ensure that "direct secure
communications" exist between the military forces of the US and those of
Taiwan.23 Although the Act does not commit the US to the defense of Taiwan in
the case of an attack by the PRC, it does allow the US to sell defensive
armaments to Taiwan and establish operational links for coordination in the
event of hostilities. 24 The Act also requires that US military schools reserve
additional seats to train Taiwanese military officers and that the technical staff at
the American Institute in Taiwan be substantially increased.2 5
The existence of the American Institute in Taiwan alone is indicative of the

Id.
G.A. Res. 2758, 26 GAOR, Supp. No. 29, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971). Resolution 2758 was
passed to replace Taipei with Beijing in the United Nations and its Security Council. (R. 21.4),
noted in Chen, supra note 13, at 234.
17 Joint Communique, Issued at Shanghai, Feb. 27, 1972, 66 Dep't
St. Cull. 435 (1972)
[hereinafter Shanghai Communique].
Is Colin P.A. Jones, United States Arms Exports to Taiwan Relations Act: The Failed Role of
Law in United State Foreign Relations, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 51, 53 (1993).
19 Id.
15
16

20

See generally United States Dept. of State, supra note 1; see generally FactBook Taiwan,

supra note 2.
" Shanghai Communiqu6, supra note 16.
22 Taiwan Relations Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 3301-16, Pub. L. 96-8 (1979); see also Greg May, Reality
Check: A Victory for Chen Shui-Bian, Not Taiwan Independence, at http://chinaonline.com/
commentary-analysis/intrelations/newsarchive.asp (last visited December 2000).

Taiwan Relations Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 3301-16.
Id.
25 Id.
23
24
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fact that the US does not treat Taiwan as part of China.26 Although the US
technically describes the Institute as unofficial, the staff is provided with official
functions and diplomatic privileges and immunities, just as are the members of
Taiwan's Economic and Culture Offices in the United States.2 7 Hence, there
exists an unofficial diplomatic channel between the United States and Taiwan by
which the US impliedly recognizes Taiwan independent from China. Further
evidence of such recognition is indicated by US support of Taiwan's
membership in international organizations, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation and the Asian Development Bank.28
The PRC's Views on Taiwan
In its 1993 White Paper, the annual official policy papers of the PRC's
communist government, Beijing explicitly stated that it regards Taiwan as
nothing more than a rebellious province and that the issue of Taiwanese
reunification with the mainland, is strictly internal. 29 According to the White
Paper, "Taiwan's status as an inalienable part of China has been determined and
30
cannot be changed, and 'self- determination' for Taiwan is out of the question.,
Although made over ten years ago, the PRC's policy established in the White
Paper has not changed. The PRC firmly continues to assert that the "Taiwan
separatists' attempt to change Taiwan's status as a part of China by referendum
on the pretext that 'sovereignty belongs to the people is futile.",31 The PRC states
that there are still hostilities between it and Taiwan left over from the civil war,
and "to safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity and realize the
reunification of the two sides of the Straits, the Chinese government has the right
to resort to any necessary means. 32 Although proclaiming peaceful measures to
be the ideal means of settling the Taiwan issue, the PRC has officially stated that
"the Chinese government always makes it clear that the means used to solve the
Taiwan issue is a matter of China's internal affairs,33and China is under no
obligation to commit itself to rule out the use of force.,

26 Stephen Lee, American Policy Toward Taiwan: The Issue of the De Facto
and De Jure Status
of Taiwan and Sovereignty, 2 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 323, 324 (1995-96).
27

Id.

28 United States Dept. of State, supra note 1. See also Lee, supra
note 26, at 324.
29 See The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21,

2000 (the NEW

YORK TIMES published the excerpts of this release by China's Taiwan Affairs Office and the
Information Office of the State Counsel) [hereinafter One-China].
30 See Taiwan Affairs Office & Information Office of the State Council,
P.R.C., The Taiwan
Question and the Reunification of China, at http://service.china.org.cn/link/wcm/ShowText
?infojid=7953&p.qry=taiwan%20and%20white%20and%20paper (last visited Jan. 18, 2004)
[hereinafter White Paper].
31 One-China, supra note 29.
32 Id.
33 Id.
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Furthermore, the PRC stated "the Chinese Government is under no obligation
to undertake any commitment to any foreign power or people intending to split
China as to what means it might use to handle its own domestic affairs. 34 The
PRC proclaimed that it will never tolerate, condone or remain indifferent to the
realization of any scheme to divide China. 35 More ominously, it continued by
saying, that if:
".... a grave turn of events occurs leading to the separation of Taiwan from China
in any name .... or if the Taiwan authonties refuse ...the peaceful settlement of
cross-Straits reunification through negotiations, then the Chinese Government will
only be forced to adopt all drastic measures possible, including the use of force, to
safeguard Chiqg's sovereignty and territoriaf integrity and fulfill the great cause of
reunification."
Prior to this radical policy development, China had threatened force only if
Taiwan declares independence or if a third party (i.e. the United States) directly
and forcibly intervenes. Under this policy, if Taiwan refuses to even negotiate
matters of reunification, China reserves the right to use force.37 With the 1993
White Paper, the PRC adopted a more aggressive stance towards Taiwan,
ironically coinciding with
38 the institution of a new round of remilitarization of the
PRC's military forces.
Taiwan's Qualifications for Statehood
For the purposes of this article, it is necessary to examine several of the
standards for statehood such as, but not exclusively, those established in the
Montevideo Convention, Principles of Effectiveness, International Airspace
agreements, and general participation in international systems.
Taiwan is an Independent State Under the Montevideo Convention
Requirements
Under the 1993 Montevideo Convention, to which the United States is a
party, Taiwan qualifies as an independent nation based on four legal
requirements. 39 These requirements are generally accepted as customary
international law, even for nations not parties to the convention. 40 The
34See

White Paper, supra note 30.
35One-China, supra note
29.
36 Id.
37Id.
38White

Paper, supranote 30.

" See Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, art. 1, 49 Stat. 3097, 165
L.N.T.S. 25 (signed at Montevideo, Uruguay, Dec. 26, 1933) [hereinafter Montevideo
Convention]; see also Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 201 (1987).
40 Carolan, supra note 9, at 450; see also Thomas D. Grant,
Defining Statehood: The Montevideo
Convention and its Discontents, 37 COLUM. J.TRANSNAT'L L. 403, 408 (1999). The author
identifies the Montevideo Convention as the most cited authority on the definition of a state.
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qualifications for independent statehood are: (1) possession of a permanent
population; (2) dominion over a defined territory; (3) maintenance of an
effective government; and (4) interaction with other states.4 '
Taiwan has a permanent population, consisting of over twenty-two million
ethnic Chinese and natives of Taiwan.42 Taiwan currently has a population
greater than seventy-five percent of the member states of the United Nations.43
Taiwan also has a clearly defined territory consisting of Formosa Island, the
Penghu Islands, Quemony Island, and Mazu Island, which was returned to China
by the Empire of Japan at the conclusion of the Second World War. 4 Taiwan no
longer lays claim to the mainland, as evidenced by its formal recognition of the
PRC and renunciation of any representation of China in the international
community. 45 Taiwan has an effective, democratically elected government based
on the Chinese constitution of 1947, with its own executive branch, legislature,
and judiciary.46 In 1987, the martial law that had been in effect since 1948 was
lifted, as well as prohibitions on certain political parties. At that time, the
Taiwanese government also initiated greater freedom of the press,.47 In 1996,
Taiwan held its first direct election for president; thus, bringing
to an end the
48
parliamentarian process of election via the National Assembly.
Finally, Taiwan is fully recognized by twenty-nine nations and has entered
into multilateral treaties with several nations. 49 Taiwan has also undergone a
complete shift in its foreign policy since 1988.50 Previously, the foreign policies
of the ROC and PRC each asserted that other nations recognize either one
government or the other-but never both.51 Taiwan now welcomes recognition
by foreign states unconditionally.52 In 1991, Taiwan informally recognized the
PRC and renounced its claim as the sole government of both Mainland China

41

See Montevideo Convention, supra note 39.

42

FactBook Taiwan, supra note 2.

43 Carolan,

supra note 9, at 45 1.
The Cairo Declaration, Dept. St. Bull. Dec.4, 1943 at 393 (quoted in Attix, supra note 49, at
367).
45 Chen, supra note 13, at
245.
46 FactBook Taiwan, supra note 2.
47 United

States Dept. of State, supra note 1.

48Id.
49 Cheri Attix, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Are Taiwan 's trading
Partners
Implying Recognition of Taiwanese Statehood?, 25 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 357, 369 (1995); see
Treaties between the Republic of China and Foreign States 1982-1985 (reprinted in Hungdah
Chui, The InternationalLegal Status of the Republic of China, 8 CHINESE Y.B. INT'L L. & AFF. 1214 (1990).
so Chen, supra note 13, at 245.
51Id.
52

Id.
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and Taiwan. 53 Additionally, in 1994, the ROC's government officially declared
that it would no longer attempt to "represent China in the international
community., 54 Thus, Taiwan meets the governing international standards of
statehood as agreed upon by binding international treaty and custom in the form
of the Montevideo Convention.
Taiwan is an Independent State Under the Principle of Effectiveness
Under the principle of effectiveness, if a state has exclusive control of a
territory for a substantial amount of time with the intent to govern that territory
as the sole sovereign, then that state will be "considered to incorporate that
territory." 55 A state that has exercised such control over the territory is to be
given preference in an international tribunal when there is a competing claim to
that territory. 56 According to Judge Alfaro of the International Court of Justice,
"[t]itle to territory is abandoned by letting another country assume and carry out
for many years all the responsibilities and expenses in connection with the
territory concerned. Such... inaction disqualifies the country concerned from
asserting the continued existence of title." 57
The PRC has never exercised jurisdiction over Taiwan, taken government
actions or enacted programs on Formosa.5 8 Over the past 50 years, the ROC has
governed Taiwan without interruption or occupation by the PRC, largely because
the PRC does not possess the military technology or equipment to take the island
by force. Since its establishment in Taiwan, the ROC has served as the only
government of the population and has acted as a sovereign nation both
domestically and internationally. Therefore under the principle of effectiveness,
Taiwan has sole dominion over the island as an independent nation.
International Airspace Agreements with Taiwan Imply Its Statehood
Taiwan has entered into airspace agreements with several nations, including
Russia, Thailand, Australia, and New Zealand. Under such agreements, each
nation's civil aircraft are allowed to fly directly into Taiwan.5 9 The agreements,
53Id.

54Id.
55Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Nor. V. Den.) 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53, at 45-64
(Apr. 5) (holding that Denmark possessed valid title to Greenland based on lengthy and sole
control of the territory), noted in Carolan, supra note 9, at 453.
56 See Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 184 (Dec. 18) (Sir Arnold McNair,
dissenting)
(stating that governments must be able to show authoritative exercise of jurisdiction to secure their
title), noted in Carolan, supra note 9, at 453.
57 Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thail), 1962 ICJ REP. 6, 45 (June 15) (see op. Alfaro,
J.), quoted in Charney & J.R.V. Prescott, supra note 5, at 463.
58 Anne Hsiu-An Hsiao, Is China's Policy to Use Force Against Taiwan a Violation of the
Principleof Non-Use of Force UnderInternationalLaw?, 32 NEw ENG. L. REv. 715, 735 (1998).
59 Attix, supra note 49, at 382.
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besides serving important business and trade purposes, also give further
legitimacy to Taiwan's claim of statehood. Under the Convention on
International Civil Aviation, "every state has complete and exclusive sovereignty
over that airspace above its territory. 6 ° In establishing flight authorization
without having consulted the PRC, the aforementioned countries recognize
Taiwan's sovereign airspace and, implicitly, its sovereignty. 6'
Taiwan's Economic Relations Reflect Those of An Independent State
Taiwan's economy has been classified as one of the "Asian Tigers., 62 Taiwan
is the fourteenth largest trading nation in the world; the United States' eighth
largest trading partner; the world's seventh largest investor; and owner of one of
the world's largest foreign exchange reserves. 6§ In 2001, Taiwan exported $27.7
billion dollars worth of goods to the United States and imported $18.2 billion
dollars in goods in 2001. Taiwan also has the world's eighteenth largest gross
national product. Additionally, the exchange rate of Taiwan's currency, the New
Taiwan Dollar, is tied to the United States' Dollar.65
Taiwan's association with international governmental organizations is also
indicative of its sovereign and independent status.66 The other members of the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and the Asian Development Bank are all
sovereign nations.67 More significantly, in 1990, Taiwan applied for membership
in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), despite protests by
the PRC that Taiwan was a province of China and, therefore, ineligible for
membership.6 8 With the support of the United States, Taiwan subsequently
became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995.69 Because
the PRC is merely an applicant to the WTO, it can be inferred that Taiwan's
membership represents de facto international recognition that Taiwan and the

60Convention

on International Civil Aviation, art. 1, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 259 (Dec. 7,

1944), noted in Attix, supra note 49, at 382.
61 Attix, supra note 49, at 382.
62

Why the "Asian Tiger" Miracle is an Endangered Species, at http://members.tripod.com

/-americanalmanac/tigers.htm (last visited October 11, 2003). This is the nickname for Taiwan,
South Korea, Malaysia and Thailand because their economies transformed themselves from poor
agrarian markets to successful Western-modeled industrial and manufacturing economies.
63United States Dept. of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, at http://www.state.gov
/r/pa/ei/bgn/2813.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2002). See also Lee, supra note 26, at 324.
64Id.
65 Chen,

supra note 13, at 238-39; see generally Y. Dolly Hwang, The Rise of a New World
Economic Power: Postwar Taiwan (1991).
66 Chen, supra note 13, at 237-38.
67United

States Dept. of State, supra note 1; see also Lee, supra note 26, at 324.

68 Hsiao,

supra note 59, at 738.

69

Id.
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PRC are two separate political and territorial entities. 70 Based on its membership
in these organizations, its trading activities, and its overall economic power, it is
difficult to accept that Taiwan is not an independent nation, but rather only a
rebellious province of China.
The Growing Military Imperative for Recognizing Taiwanese Independence
The Peoples Liberation Army ("PLA"), the armed forces of the PRC, is one of
the largest militaries in the world. However, most of its military technology and
support capabilities date back to the 1970s and some even as far back as the
Korean War. 7 1 As a result, China is ill-prepared to launch a cross-Strait invasion
and face the modem American and European weapon systems that have been
sold to Taiwan. 72 The PRC began a massive re-armament program in the early
1980s called the 863 Program, which it accelerated in 1996 to achieve
completion by 2010.73 Additionally, PLA training, doctrinal writings, weapons
procurement, and propaganda have been extensively focused on a military
campaign against Taiwan and, if necessary, the United States.7 4 This
modernization, combined with the belligerent language of the PRC's White
Paper, increases the threat of the PRC attempting to prevent Taiwanese
independence via military means.
Notwithstanding the use of nuclear weapons to destroy Formosa, the PRC
could employ several military options if it decides to use force against the
ROC.75 These options differ in terms of the PRC's technological capabilities,
effectiveness, and possible international backlash. The first option is naval
exercises and missile testing, such as those undertaken in 1995 and 1996, which
Taiwanese government
or, at the very least, clearly evidence
may intimidate the
,
76
the PRC's displeasure with Taiwan. The second option would be to enact a
naval quarantine designed to prevent the arrival of additional high tech Western
Although the
arms to the ROC from the United States and Europe.
effectiveness of such a measure is questionable, due to American airlift
capabilities, it would have severe political and economic ramifications on
Taiwan. The potential for such a confrontation between the US and PRC could
70

Id.

W. Moore, Institute for Defense and Armament Studies, China'sMilitary Capabilities,
at http://www.comw.org/cmp/fulltext/iddschina.htmI (last visited Oct. 1, 2002).
71Frank
72 See

Jones, supra note 18.
73June Dreyer, The PLA and the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan Security Research, at http://taiwan

security.org/IS/Dreyer-The-PLA-and-the-Taiwan-Strait.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2002).
74Campbell & Mitchell, supra note 3; see Al Santoli, "Chinese military resumes
harassing US
recon flights; Chinese navy practicesattacks on US aircraftcarriers, China Reform Monitor, No.

418 (Dec. 10, 2001), at http://www.afpc.org/crm/crm4l8.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2002).
75Kim Viner, PotentialMilitary Solutionsfor the Taiwan Question, ASIAN AFFAIRS, (Fall
1997).

76See Campbell & Mitchell, supra note
3.
77Viner, supra note 76.
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cause the United States to reevaluate its willingness to risk a war in defense of
Taiwan. 8
The third option is a direct amphibious assault on Taiwan with the intent of
capturing and holding it. However, this option, unless coupled with the use of
biological, chemical, or nuclear strikes, would most likely end in failure due to
the inadequacy of the PLA amphibious forces.7 9 At this time, the PLA only has
transport capabilities for 10,000 soldiers compared to the 240,000 currently
serving in the Taiwanese Army, which also has a 1.5 million-man reserve
force.80 Even if the PLA augmented its troop transportation capabilities with
commercial vessels, a successful invasion would still be unlikely because the
defender ratio that traditional
PRC could not achieve a three attackers-to-one
81
military doctrine dictates for success.
Conclusion
Under international law, Taiwan qualifies as a state. It possesses the legal
requirements stated in the Montevideo Treaty and is treated as a political entity
separate from the PRC by other nations and international organizations.
Economically, it has proven itself to be a vital, self-sustaining member of the
world market with the financial mechanisms and commitments befitting an
independent nation. There is no legal justification for denying Taiwan statehood,
as it clearly cannot be considered a PRC province after fifty-five uninterrupted
years of self-rule. The looming threat of invasion and war with the PRC has
always hung over Taiwan and is arguably the sole reason for its reluctance to
declare its independence and claim sovereignty.
With the acceleration of the PRC's modernization programs, the possibility of
a successful invasion of Taiwan is increasing. The PLA is specifically focusing
on upgrading and creating new amphibious landing crafts to support a growing
compliment of rapid reaction forces trained in airborne and amphibious island
assaults.82 Additionally, the PRC Air Force is undergoing extensive training to
support an amphibious landing and to counter Western aircraft and US aircraft
carriers.83 If military buildup continues at current rates, the PRC's offensive
capabilities may outstrip the ROC's defensive capabilities within the next five to

78

Conflict in the Taiwan Strait: American Response, at http://taiwansecurity.org/IS/IS-Lasater-

0200.htm (last visited October 11, 2003).
79 Richard Halloran, Analysts Downplay Threat China Poses to Taiwan, WASH. TIMES,
at
http://www.fas.org/news/china/2000/e20000515analysts.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2002).
80 Moore, supra note 72.
The Microscopic Model, at http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR638/chap2.html (last
visited October 11, 2003). Military theorists from Von Clausewitz to Schwarzkopf have
recognized this principle of proportionality when attacking a fortified enemy position.
82 Moore, supra note
72.
83 Santoli, supra note 75.
81
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ten years.84 The PRC's ability to crush the ROC and occupy Taiwan, bringing its
territory and over twenty-two million citizens under the control of the
communist government in Beijing, is increasing every year. From a purely
military standpoint, Taiwan's chances for successfully declaring independence in
the near future are decreasing as the PRC's remilitarization and technological
overhaul of its armed forces continues. 85
For the time being, however, the PRC lacks the military capabilities and
training to stop a declaration of independence by Taiwan short of a nuclear
attack. Additionally, the threat of confrontation with the United States, acting in
accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, would likely stay the unprepared
PRC from military action.86 Although the PRC cannot effectively undertake
direct military action presently, the day is coming when the revamped armed
forces of the PRC will be able to reunify China with force. Therefore, now is the
time for the United States to let Taiwan know it is prepared to recognize it as a
sovereign, independent nation.
Beyond the legal issues and Machiavellian geopolitics, there lies the simple
proposition of guaranteeing the life and liberty of over twenty-two million free
people who support their democratic government. To sit back and allow Taiwan
to be absorbed by an aggressive, undemocratic PRC would be to repeat the
mistakes of the past. Such a course of inaction, sacrificing a small democracy to
appease a powerful neighbor, harkens back to when Chamberlain gave Hitler
Czechoslovakia and Roosevelt let Stalin have Eastern Europe. Although the
legal and political justifications for recognizing Taiwan as an independent nation
are both compelling and overwhelming, the irony of a young democracy
struggling for its independence against a giant power from across the sea should
not be ignored by American leaders.

84 See

David Shambaugh, A Matter of Time: Taiwan's Eroding Military Advantage, WASH.
QUARTERLY, (Spring 2000), at http://www.twq.com/spring00/232shambaugh.pdf (last visited Oct.
1, 2002); but see Halloran, supra note 80.
95See Future Military Capabilities and Strategy of the People's Republic of China, at
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR638/chap2.html (last visited October 11, 2003). See also,
China Special Weapons News, at http://www.fas.org/news/china/1998/index.html (last visited
October 11, 2003).
86 Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, U.S.C. Title 22 Chapter 48 § 3302.
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